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Zen as the Negation of Holiness
Hisamatsu Shin’ichi
I
Worldly passions fallen away, 
Empty of all holy intent,
I linger not where Buddha dwells 
And hasten by where no Buddha is.
The Ten Oxherding Pictures
Holiness has in recent times been distinguished as a concept from truth, 
good, and beauty, relevant respectively to science, morality, and aes­
thetics, and has come to be used as a technical term to express in particular 
the religious. The term “holiness” for Kant held merely an ethical con­
notation. It remained the ultimate goal of morality, and yet in Kant at 
the same time it belonged as a matter of course to a dimension surre­
alistic in the sense of being the ideal perfection of good never to be realized 
in the actual world. Thus holiness embodied a meaning quite different 
from the good that can be simply realized. Kant, however, did not pursue 
the question of holiness to the point the particularly religious was dis­
cerned as an element distinct from the ethical.
Holiness as a term strictly grounded in philosophy and expressive of 
the religious in particular for all intents and purposes can probably be 
traced back to the time of the German Neo-Kantian philosopher Wilhelm 
Windelband (1848-1915). For Windelband, however, holiness was no 
more than a transcendental element included as a constituent necessary 
to and yet not distinct from those of truth, good, and beauty. Conse-
♦ This paper was originally written in X937. At that time, Rudolf Otto’s approach to 
religion and the Dialectical Theology of Karl Barth and Emil Brunner were much 
discussed in learned religious circles in Japan. Footnotes are provided by the translator. 
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qucntly, the specific characteristics of holiness in Windciband cannot 
be recounted apart from or beyond those of truth, good, and beauty.
Holiness in Rudolf Otto (1869-1937), a German theologian-philosopher 
well-known for his book The Idea of the Holy, has in this regard an import 
differing from that of Windclband. According to Otto, holiness has its 
basic form in the numinous.1 This is a category completely different from 
those of truth, good, and beauty. That is, the numinous cannot be conceived 
of in a moral frame of reference; it is not rational per se. It remains a 
matter completely incapable of being cogitated: an irrational, an “ab­
solute other” which is independently existing. It can justifiably be said 
that in Otto, holiness is not simply synonymous with the numinous. It is a 
compound category created through a synthesis of the numinous with 
rational, in particular, moral elements. Thus it is not completely bereft 
of moral reference, and at the same time, however, it is neither based on 
morality as proved the case with Kant, nor based on truth, good, and 
beauty as with Windelband. In this sense, holiness based on the numinous 
in Otto belongs to an order wholly apart from those of Kant and Win­
delband.
1 numinous. Otto coined the term "numinous" from the Latin numm meaning "god,” 
"spirit,” "divine," on the analogy of "ominous” from "omen.” In his exploration of the 
non-rational aspects of religion, Otto used the term "numinous" to refer to the awe­
inspiring element of religious experience which "evades precise formulation in words. 
Like the beauty of a musical composition, it is non-rational and eludes complete con­
ceptual analysis; hence it must be discussed in symbolic terms.”
In reference to the Kantian view of holiness based upon a moral perfec­
tion unattainable in man, the Swedish theologian and historian of religions 
Nathan Sodcrblom (1866-1931) considered holiness not simply as some­
thing moral but as being beyond morality, that is, the religious. However, 
inasmuch as it still requires moral perfection, the religious of Sdderblom, 
in remaining unattainable by man, is not unlike in quality to morality 
and can be conceived of from a moral frame of reference. As this order 
of holiness can never be regarded as being irrational, it would in all 
probability not be called holiness per se, at least not from Otto’s perspec­
tive. With Soderblom, holiness is not simply a moral concept but a concept 
of the religious, and he excludes those who regard nothing as holy as 
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being outside of the religious. At first glance, Sodcrblom’s holiness seems 
much the same as Otto’s. Upon closer examination, however, insofar as 
the holiness of Sdderblom is nothing other than perfection based virtually 
on morality, it must be said that the concepts of holiness of Sdderblom 
and Otto differ fundamentally.
For Otto, whether morality is imperfect or perfect, and whether it can 
be actualized in reality or not, are not the criteria which determine the 
holy. The fundamental criterion of holiness is whether the basic substance 
of “holiness” is moralistic or trans-moralistic. Since that is the criterion 
which exists, imperfection in morality is by no means deprecatory to the 
basic substance of holiness. In this regard, more than any previous propo­
nent, Otto deftly grasps the authenticity of holiness, and accordingly is able 
to establish the independence of the religious. In spite of this, however, as 
far as what Otto calls holiness is concerned, it can be criticized as being 
all too humanistic; it cannot be said to be holiness to the extent of having 
become the “divine,” as is the case in Dialectical Theology. By the “di­
vine” we mean the sacredness expressed in the Christian sense of God 
or the Holy.
For Otto, holiness is to be understood simply as one state of human 
consciousness, and as such it is nothing but an autonomous element in­
capable of being reduced into or derived from other forms of consciousness. 
In Dialectical Theology, however, the “divine” is never a state of human 
consciousness, being as it is completely outside of man, thus something 
with the character of “absolute otherness.” At points where Otto states 
that creature-feeling2 is our response toward the numinous, the numinous 
appears similar to that which is outside of or beyond man. Upon closer 
examination, however, the numinous is found to be merely a special state 
of consciousness which lies within man in the base of creature-fee ling, 
thus making a chance element of its being evoked. It cannot therefore 
be said to be strictly outside of or beyond man.
2 creature-fetling. In place of Schleiermacher’s “absolute dependence,” Otto sub­
stituted the term “creature-feeling” which in his words “is itself a first subjective 
concomitant and efffet of another feeling element, which casts it like a shadow, but which 




Bringing this into the light of Dialectical Theology, even the holiness 
of Otto has little chance of avoiding denunciation for its affinity to the 
immanent sacredness of mysticism. The “divine” of Dialectical Theology 
is not to be thought of as man’s inner conscious condition or state of feeling 
but as an objective reality that absolutely transcends man. The “divine” 
of Dialectical Theology, in this regard, even more than the holiness of 
Otto, must be said to profoundly penetrate religious reality to its 
core. While being irrational and “absolute otherness,” the holiness of 
Otto nonetheless dwells within man, being neither outside of nor tran­
scendent of him. It can in other words be said to be either immanent 
irrationality or immanent Otherness, but not to be either transcendent 
irrationality or transcendent Otherness.
The irrationality of the religious must be grasped in its character of 
transcendence, and the reason Otto was unable to penetrate to this level 
is due to his position which is indistinguishable from that of psychologism, 
as is the case with Schleiermacher. Being similar to the humanistic ap­
proach of Feuerbach and others, psychologism is incapable of grasping 
the true transhuman character of the divine, a perspective gained only in 
overcoming psychologism by virtue of a position such as Dialectical 
Theology. Consequently, when holiness is to be interpreted in its ultimately 
religious sense, it must necessarily be elevated to that of the “divine” as 
explicated in Dialectical Theology.
Even when the term “holiness” is interpreted in its most radical form, 
however, there is something which does not accept even such a concept 
and strives for the highest reach of the religious in the “non-holy,” 
that is, in the negation of holiness. A religion like Zen is precisely that. 
The words in the Lin-chi lu (The Record of Lin-chi), “On meeting a Buddha, 
slay the Buddha. On meeting a patriarch, slay the patriarch,” an allusion 
indicating attainment of that highest reach, will probably suffice, provided 
one succeeds in plumbing them to their very depths.
II
Holiness, generally speaking, is originally transcendental. Between 
holiness and man or the actual world, there persists an unbridgeable gap 
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or separation. The “divine” of Dialectical Theology represents the most 
radical form of this separation. Even when speaking of the concepts of 
holiness in Otto, Sdderblom, or Windelband, however, this unbridgeable 
and transcendent gap or “great separation” has to be regarded as being 
intrinsic. Without it, holiness does not come to exist. Terms such as 
Otto’s “creature-feeling,” or “absolute otherness,” or “mysUrium 
tremendum,'* 3 as well as Emil Brunner’s “self-extinguish” (sick vcrlieren), 
while not possessing exactly the same meaning, adequately convey the 
notion of a transcendent gap contingent to holiness or sacredncss. Although 
holiness can be said to constitute a transcendent gap, this of course does 
not mean interaction does not occur between what is holy and man. 
It is quite the contrary, for the gap itself is the link which unites man 
to this “holiness.” That is why Otto recognizes the aspect of “fascinans”* 
in the numinous and why Dialectical Theologians paradoxically emphasize 
that the gap or absolute disparity itself is an approach to God.
3 mysUrium trermndum. One aspect of numinous experience.
* jWinanj. Another aspect of numinous experience. The dual qualities of mysUrium 
tremtndum and Jascinans arc characteristic of Otto’s way of expressing man’s encounter 
with the Holy.
This conjunction, be it where it may, is one which does not obliterate 
the separation. It is a conjunction such that no elimination of the separa­
tion occurs due to the event of conjunction. Here, the gap itself is a 
conjunction, and the conjunction itself a gap. Since both the gap and 
conjunction simultaneously coexist, this could be referred to as a “dis­
parate conjunction.'*
A religion of holiness is a religion of disparate conjunction. Brunner says 
that faith is discovering the self in the annihilation of self, and that notion 
indicates something of a disparate conjunction. When Brunner speaks of 
an extinguishing of self, it has the meaning of entering into a disparate 
conjunction with God. This stands in contrast to the extinction of self 
in unio mystica with the divine. The self not extinguished of self is a 
self wanting in faith; it docs not enter into conjunction with the divine. 
Only the self extinguished of self—sometimes called the self that be­
comes “no thing” or Mu—can be said to be the truly faithful self entered 
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into conjunction with the divine. This is why it has been said that one 
cannot embrace religious faith unless one becomes “no thing” or Mu.
The “no thing” of mysticism should strictly be distinguished from the 
“no thing” of religious faith. For Brunner, while it is said that one ex­
tinguishes the self, the self that has extinguished the self still exists. Such 
a self has an absolute great separation from the divine, and because of 
this, even when the self is extinguished, it is not dissolved into sacredness 
as is the case in mysticism. Instead, it should be made clear that only by 
the extinguishing of the self does one come to realize this absolute gap, the 
realization of which brings one into unity with the divine. At this point, 
the deeper religious content becomes apparent in such concepts as ho­
liness, dependence, extinguished self, and faith.
Schleiermachcr’s “absolute dependence” indicates a union between 
the sacred and man, but this concept as well is suggestive of a disparate 
conjunction. Without a gap, a dependent relation cannot be established, 
and for Schleiermacher the “feeling of freedom” is absolutely negated. 
With the appearance of a dependent relation, however, the gap or “great 
separation” does not disappear. It is rather simply because of this gap 
that the dependent relation becomes at all possible.
In Buddhism, the jCdo Shin sect has points of similarity to Dialectical 
Theology. It can be said to be a religion of disparate conjunction. Jodo 
Shin Buddhism absolutely negates the self by extinguishing the self and 
uniting it with Amida Buddha. By this union, however, one does not 
dissolve into Amida Buddha. By virtue of “entrusting oneself to Amida 
Buddha,” one enters into a relation of absolute dependence, a relation 
in which there is an absolute gap between the base evil self and Amida 
Buddha and yet there is still a union.
The union is of course an element essential to holiness, but it presupposes 
as prerequisite a gap. There is no order of holiness possible without it. 
A holiness without such a separation may be considered as meaningless. 
Precisely because it is transcendent and greatly separated from us, holiness 
is to be revered, worshipped, trusted, or believed in by us.
Zen nonetheless negates the transcendent and objective holiness greatly 
separated from us, just as it does not recognize Buddha as existing sepa­
rately apart from human beings. In this sense it can be properly called 
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“non-holy.” By recapturing the holy Buddha which has been separated 
and far removed from human beings and realizing it within human beings, 
Zen tries to establish a human-Buddha that is “non-holy.” Neither search­
ing for Buddhas or gods outside man nor seeking Paradise or Pure Lands 
in other dimensions, Zen advances man as Buddha, actuality as Pure 
Land. In the Hsiieh-mai lun (On the Lineage of Dharma) t a work traditionally 
attributed to Bodhidharma, it says:
Being in tremendous turmoil, the unoriented do not know 
their own mind is Buddha. Outwardly they search about, 
spending the whole day contemplating the Buddha and paying 
homage. But where is the Buddha? Do not entertain any such 
false views. Awaken to your own Mind: outside the Mind there 
can be no Buddha.
In the Platform Sutra of the Sixth Patriarch it says:
The unenlightened person does not understand his own true 
nature, does not realize the Pure Land in his own body, and thus 
petitions all over. The enlightened man never differs no matter 
where he is. For this reason the Buddha says, “Wherever I may 
be I am always in comfort and bliss. . . .If only your Mind is 
pure, your own nature is itself the Pure Land in the West.’*
Zen from its very outset in deliberate emphasis of man used words 
such as self-mind, self-nature, Self, original nature, original face, true 
man, mind-nature, Self-Buddha, and original-nature-Buddha. The 
reason for this lies in a Copernican effort to bring the transcendental, 
objective holiness down to the basis of the human self and to grasp it as 
the subject of the self.
Lin-chi says:
The pure light in your single thought—this is the Dharmakaya 
Buddha within your own house. The non-discriminating light in 
your single thought—this is the Sambhogakaya Buddha within 
your own house. The non-differentiating light in your single 
thought—this is the Nirmanakaya Buddha within your own 
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house. This Threefold Body is you—listening to my discourse 
right now before my very eyes.
In this passage, we can see Zen does not regard the Threefold Body, 
Dharmakaya, Sambhogakaya, and Nirmanakaya, as something myth­
ological or transcendent, but tries to verify it existentially here and now 
within one’s own body. In Zen, the traditional Thirty-two (or Eighty) 
Distinguishing Features of the Buddha arc not to be taken literally. They 
are regarded as symbolic features of the self.
In the Samadhi on the Distinguishing Features or in the Pratyutpanna 
Samadhi, in all cases where the Buddha under contemplation is considered 
to be transcendentally taking form, the Buddha is regarded important 
as an object of contemplation, of meditation, and of prayer, as well as 
the source from which merits accrue. Consequently, the sometimes elabo­
rately carved and painted Buddha images came to be believed by some 
people as being the Buddha himself. From the transmission of Buddhism 
to Japan in the sixth century up to the Kamakura period, one of the 
reasons why the art of the Buddha image flourished was because the Bud­
dha was considered as holy and transcendent. It is thus natural in view 
of its religious milieu that the Buddhist sculptures and paintings of this 
period are typically holy and transcendent.
In Zen, no Buddha exists outside of the self. There is no Buddha to be 
worshipped or revered as something separate from oneself. Huang-po 
says, “If you seek the Buddha outwardly and practice Buddhism by 
attaching yourself to the form of the Buddha, these are wrong ways which 
sully the way of awakening.” In the Hsueh-mai lun {On the Lineage of 
Dharma) it says:
One’s own Mind is Buddha, so you should not worship Buddha 
with Buddha. Although there are features of the Buddha and the 
Bodhisattva, even if they should suddenly manifest themselves 
before you, you need not pay homage to them.
Since in Zen objectifying or giving form to Buddha is always cautioned 
against, there is little concern with making Buddha images. This is one 
reason Buddhist sculptors arc not found among the Zen patriarchs as 
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they are among the patriarchs of the Tendai, Shingon, and other Bud­
dhist sects.
Human Buddhas such as the images of arhats and Zen patriarchs 
are more suitable for Zen than transcendent Buddhas such as Amida or 
Mahavairocana, or the Devas. The mountain scenery as the Buddha’s 
body or the valley stream as the preaching of the Dharma are preferable 
to depictions of transcendent paradisiacal realms such as the Pure Land 
or those depicted in mandalas. For Zen it is wondrous just as it is: the head 
big, eyes small, nose low, mouth horizontal. Mountains towering, valleys 
plunging deep, birds crying, monkeys gamboling, are, as such, mandalas. 
Ch’an-yueh’s Arhats and Mu-chi’s landscapes can be said to be Buddhist 
painting in the Zen style. In periods when Zen flourished, in the Sung 
Dynasty, in the latter Kamakura, Muromachi, Momoyama, and up to 
the beginning of the Tokugawa period, it was not only in painting but 
also in literature, social etiquette, performing arts, architectural design, 
crafts, and landscape gardening that the expression of the Zen which 
negates holiness was found. The special characteristics of the culture of 
those periods, distilled in such words as wabit sabi, jriigen, simplicity or 
non-constraint, are qualities rooted in Zen.
Okakura Tenshin5 regarded sado, the Way of Tea, as an expression of 
Zen. In his Bock of Tea he wrote: “The secret of Tea lies in its ap­
preciation of something which is incomplete.” The exquisite beauty of 
Tea, however, lies in the negation of completeness: it is not that, in 
Okakura’s words, “by deliberately not finishing something, one completes 
it by virtue of one’s own imagination.” The philosophy of Zen does not 
consist of that which, as Okakura would have it, “attaches importance 
to the procedure by which one searches for completeness rather than 
completeness itself.” One should say that importance is attached to the 
negating of completeness rather than completeness itself. Asymmetry and 
incompleteness in the Way of Tea do not point in the direction of sym­
metry and completeness. They indicate the self-negation of symmetry 
and completeness. In the Way of Tea, sabi should not be taken in the 
3 Okakura Kakuzd (1862-1913), known by his pseudonym Tenshin, was a reformer 
of Japanese art in the Meiji era. As curator of the Oriental Department of Boston 
Museum he was also instrumental in introducing Oriental art to the West.
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sense of the rust over that yet to sparkle, but as the extinguished gloss of 
that which once had sparkled.
Ill
Above I mentioned Zen as being a religion of “man simply being 
Buddha” which negates the “holy” and transcendent and does not search 
for the Buddha separated from or external to man’s self. In speaking 
these words, however, it is not with the intention of affirming the notion 
that man in his usual state is Buddha, the view of anthropocentric 
idealism prevalent in the modem age, or that the idealized form of man 
is Buddha. Zen’s affirmation of man is not so simplistic. It is the position 
of Zen rather to negate absolutely the usual state of man. Po-chang 
Huai-hai emphasizes the need for a great “abandoning” by saying:
You should first abandon all ties with the world and cease 
everything. Do not imagine all manner of things as being good 
or bad, worldly or unworldly. Be not involved in thoughts, and 
so doing, abandon body and mind.
Lin-chi preaches the need for a great “slaying” by saying:
Whatever you encounter, whether within or without, slay 
it at once:
On meeting a Buddha, slay the Buddha.
On meeting a patriarch, slay the patriarch.
On meeting an arhat, slay the arhat.
On meeting your parents, slay your parents.
On meeting your kinsman, slay your kinsman.
Only then do you attain emancipation.
Both of them stress strongly the absolute negation of the usual state of 
man. Zen in this regard does not differ from Dialectical Theology. The 
“divine” to be affirmed, it should be noted, has the clement of great 
separation and transcendence from the usual state of man to be negated. 
For Zen, however, in the absolute negation of the usual state of man, it 
is not that the absolute great separation exists in fact between the “divine” 
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and man, as in Dialectical Theology, but rather that man dissolves into 
the “divine” and becomes completely “unio mystica.”
Unlike Dialectical Theology, Zen is not the union of the great separa­
tion. It is the union of non-difference, which, being non-dualistic, leaves 
no trace of opposition. The Buddha and the unenlightened one are 
thus of one form. Buddha and sentient being are not two. But this 
does not imply uniformity in the sense of a Buddha who has a form. 
Lin-chi says that the true Buddha is formless and thus must have neither 
spatial nor spiritual form. For a similar reason the Sixth Patriarch says:
The capacity of the Mind is vast and great:
It is like the emptiness of space;
It has neither breadth nor bounds;
It is neither square nor round; neither large nor small;
It is neither blue nor yellow nor red nor white;
It has neither upper nor lower, long nor short;
It knows of neither anger nor pleasure; neither right nor wrong; 
neither good nor evil;
It is without beginning and without end.
What the Sixth Patriarch calls “Mind” in this passage is not different 
from what Lin-chi calls the “True Buddha.’* These are merely different 
names for the same thing. Lin-chi also speaks of a True Buddha as Mind- 
Dharma saying, “the Mind-Dharma being formless penetrates the ten 
directions.” This True Buddha in Zen is referred to by different names 
and explained in various ways, but I think it can be said to be “the Self 
which eliminates distinctions internally and goes beyond opposition 
externally.” Only then can the Self of Zen be characterized as being 
“formless, penetrating the ten directions,’* “like empty space,” “com­
pletely clear: not a single thing to be seen,” or “the No Thing (Mu) 
outside the Mind, unobtainable even inside of it,” or “One Mind only,” 
“neither bom nor extinguished, neither increasing nor decreasing,” or 
“Mind in itself is Buddha.”
The union of non-difference in Zen is a union of Buddha and man such 
that the True Man as such is not outside the True Buddha inasmuch as 
the True Buddha as such is not outside the True Man. The term “union” 
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here merely involves one and the same thing and does not indicate a com­
bined union of two different entities. If there were two entities, they could 
possibly be brought into combination. But since the True Buddha and 
the True Man are one and the same, it cannot be said to combine, or 
even to unify.
This is the union spoken of by the Sixth Pariarch in his so called “one 
form samadhi.” In Zen, unlike Dialectical Theology, there is found 
neither a “Thou” in the sense of “All is thine” nor an “I” that is com­
pletely nothing. The “I” of Zen is rather the “All” and stands in contrast 
to Dialectical Theology’s “I as complete nothing.” Although “I” is “All,” 
this “All” is itself “One” as in “All is One.” In the “I” of Zen there is 
no opposition externally and no discrimination internally, thus it is called 
“no thing.” In this regard, the Sixth Patriarch says, “not a single thing,” 
and Huang-po, “like empty space.” In the Pi-yen chi {Blue Cliff Records} 
it is referred to as “vastness.” All of these are but differing expressions for 
“no thing” in Zen.
The “no thing” of Zen can of itself be called the “no thing of mysti­
cism.” The “no thing” as mere self-negation, however, cannot really be 
called “mystic.” If the latter form of “no thing” were to be insisted upon 
as being mysticism, then mysticism would necessarily have to be limited 
to being merely a self-negating element included in all religions. Zen, 
however, as well as Western mysticism, is not based on such a “no 
thing” of mere self-negation. It is based on the “no-thing” of the True 
Buddha, and as such, cannot be seen as an occasion for self-negation.
On the other hand, Zen takes up neither the deification of man, a 
position naively assumed in modem times, nor the position of a tran­
scendent God insisted upon by Dialectical Theology. The crucial position 
of Zen is to affirm the “sacred in man” by retrieving the sacred from the 
reaches of transcendent views or objective forms and returning it to the 
folds of human subjectivity. Zen is not simply a rational position: it is a 
rational position paradoxically identical with non-rationality. It is not 
simply an immanent position but one which takes up the position of 
transcendental immanence. The original nature of Zen as well as that of 
Mahayana Buddhism should be perceived of in this light.
Translated by Sally Merrill
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